We settle the complexity of computing an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions l e,i (x) = a e,i x + b e,i as we show that the computation is PPAD-complete. To prove that the problem is contained in PPAD, we develop a homotopy method that traces an equilibrium for varying flow demands of the players. A key technique for this method is to describe the evolution of the equilibrium locally by a novel block Laplacian matrix where each entry of the Laplacian is a Laplacian again. Using the properties of this matrix allows to recompute efficiently the Laplacian after the support of the equilibrium changes by matrix pivot operations. These insights give rise to a path following formulation for computing an equilibrium where states correspond to supports that are feasible for some demands and neighboring supports are feasible for increased or decreased flow demands. A closer investigation of the block Laplacian system further allows to orient the states giving rise to unique predecessor and successor states thus putting the problem into PPAD. For the PPAD-hardness, we reduce from computing an approximate equilibrium of a bimatrix win-lose game. As a byproduct of our reduction we further show that computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium with class dependent affine cost functions is PPAD-complete as well.
Introduction
Congestion games are a central topic in algorithmic game theory with applications in traffic [5, 15, 52, 48] , telecommunication [4, 44, 46] , and logistics [12] . We are given a graph G = (V, E) with a finite set of k commodities, each specified by a triplet (s i , t i , r i ) ∈ V × V × R ≥0 consisting of a source node s i , a target node t i , and a fixed demand rate r i . Each edge e ∈ E is endowed with a flow-dependent (and possibly commodity-specific) cost function l e,i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 that maps its flow
x i e to a cost l e,i (x e ) experienced by all flow particles of commodity i using that edge. In Wardrop's basic model [52] , each commodity corresponds to a continuum of users. Each user acts selfishly in minimizing their total cost, i.e., the sum of the costs of the used edges. The corresponding equilibrium concept of a Wardrop equilibrium is defined as a multi-commodity flow with the additional property that each commodity only uses paths of minimum cost. Wardrop equilibria exist under mild assumptions on the cost functions [5, 51] . When the cost functions of an edge are equal for all commodities, an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by convex programming techniques [5] . For the case of commodity-dependent affine cost functions, Meunier and Pradeau [41] very recently showed that the problem to compute a Wardrop equilibrium lies in PPAD, but left it as an open problem whether the problem is actuall PPAD-complete.
In the light of the rise of navigation systems such as Waze and TomTom and ride sharing platforms such as Lyft and Uber, and in view of the anticipated market penetration of autonomous cars, it is sensible to assume that in the near future several competing companies will control significant portions of the road traffic. Similarly, the ongoing discussion on Net Neutrality Rules for the Internet are fueled by the fact that few companies constitute and control large portions of the internet traffic, e.g., these days Netflix and YouTube each constitute about 15% of total downstream traffic worldwide [50] . In these traffic scenarios some players may be willing to sacrifice the cost experienced by some of their traffic in order to improve the overall cost of their flow, see also the discussion in Catoni and Pallottino [9] . Atomic splittable congestion are a much more compelling model in these situations. In such a game, each commodity corresponds to a single player who controls a splittable flow of traffic in the network. The goal of the player is to minimize the total cost of the its flow defined as C(x) = e∈E x i e l e,i (x e ). A multi-commodity flow x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a Nash equilibrium if C i (x) ≤ C i (x i , x i ) for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all s i -t i -flows of rate r i , where (x i , x i ) denotes the multi-commodity flow where all player j = i send the flow x j and player i sends the flowx i .
Despite considerable progress regarding the computational complexity of general equilibria in bimatrix games [10, 16] , Wardrop equilibria [5, 41] , and atomic-unsplittable congestion games [1, 19] , much less is known regarding the computation of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games. For affine player-independent cost functions, Cominetti et al. [12] showed that an equilibrium can be found by computing the minimum of a convex potential function, see also Huang [32] for a combinatorial algorithm for special graph topologies. Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [8] proposed two algorithms with exponential worst-case complexity that compute ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria in singleton games with convex costs. Harks and Timmermans [25] developed a polynomial time algorithm that computes an equilibrium in singleton games with player-specific affine cost functions.
Besides leaving the complexity of computing an equilibrium wide open, the approaches above also yield only a single equilibrium for a fixed vector of player demands. Moreover, the algorithms of Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [6] and Harks and Timmermans [25] work only for singleton games played on a network with two nodes. In actual traffic scenarios, the assumption that the players' demand vector is fully known and fixed is unrealistic since demands often fluctuate. In this paper, we are interested in understanding how the equilibria in atomic splittable games change as a function of the players' demand vectors.
Our results and techniques. We settle the complexity of computing an equilibrium in an atomic splittable congestion game with player-specific affine costs showing that it is PPAD-complete. The complexity class PPAD ("polynomial parity argument on directed graphs") captures the complexity of search problems that can be solved by directed path-following algorithms [45] . A problem is in PPAD if there is an exponential set of states S and polynomial computable functions start, pred(·), and succ(·) computing a start state, and well-defined predecessor and successor states for a given state. The goal is to compute a solution which is defined as a state that does not have a successor (different from the start state that does not have a predecessor). Most notably the problem to compute an equilibrium of a bimatrix game is PPAD-complete, even in special cases [10, 16, 40] . Formally, we show the PPAD-completeness of the following problem:
Nash-Atomic-Splittable Input:
atomic splittable congestion game (G, K, l) with graph G = (V, E), commodities K = (s 1 , t 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (s k , t k , r k ) , and cost functions l e,i (x) = a e,i x + b e,i for some a e,i ∈ R >0 , b e,i ∈ R ≥0 . Output: Nash equilibrium x of (G, K, l).
Result 1 (cf. Theorems 3 and 5). Nash-Atomic-Splittable is PPAD-complete.
To show PPAD-hardness, we reduce from the problem to compute an n −β -approximate Nash equilibrium for a n × n win-lose bimatrix game that is PPAD-complete for all β > 0 [11] . Our reduction requires only two players and produces an atomic splittable congestion game on a planar graph implying hardness even for this special case. This is an interesting contrast to the PLScompleteness results for computing Nash equilibria in unsplittable congestion games using a nonconstant number of players and highly non-planar graphs [2, 19] . As a byproduct, we also obtain PPAD-completeness for a related problem settling an open question from Meunier and Pradeau [41] .
Result 2 (cf. Theorem 6) . Computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
The more challenging part of the proof is to show that Nash-Atomic-Splittable is contained in PPAD. To this end, we develop a path following algorithm that pivots over player supports in a similar fashion to the Lemke-Howson-algorithm for bimatrix games [38] . Our algorithm follows a continuous path of Nash equilibria x(λ) for demand rates λr 1 , . . . , λr k while changing λ ∈ [0, 1]. During the course of the algorithm, λ is changed in a continuous but non-monotonic matter. To describe the evolution of λ consider an arbitrary value λ * ∈ [0, 1) and a corresponding equilibrium x(λ * ) and let us fix the supports of (x 1 , . . . , x k ). By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for each player, we derive that in x(λ * ) every player only uses paths that minimize the marginal total cost. This implies that for every player i, there is a vector of vertex potentials π i such that that player i uses edge e = (u, v) if and only if the difference in vertex potentials π i v − π i u is at least b e,i . Going further, we can reformulate the Nash equilibrium conditions as a system of linear equations of the form y = Lπ − b where y = ((y 1 ) ⊤ , . . . , (y k ) ⊤ ) ⊤ is a block excess vector containing the excess y i v for each player i and each vertex v, π = ((π 1 ) ⊤ , . . . , (π k ) ⊤ ) ⊤ is the block potential vector, and b ∈ R nk is an appropriate offset. The matrix L ∈ R nk×nk is a block matrix of the form L :=      L 11 −L 12 · · · −L 1k −L 21 L 22 · · · −L 2k . . . . . . . . . . . .
where the diagonal matrices L ii are weighted Laplacian matrices for the graph containing only the edges in the support of player i. The off-diagonal matrices −L ij and −L ji with i = j are the negative of weighted Laplacian matrices for the graph containing only the edges in the support of both player i and j. The weights of the matrices L ij depend on the coefficients a e,j while the weights of the matrices L ji depend on the coefficients a e,i so that L is non-symmetric. We call L the block Laplacian matrix of the graph. We proceed to show that the block Laplacian borrows a lot of structure from normal graph Laplacians. In particular we show that rank(L) = k(n − 1), except for a degenerated case that will be discussed later. This implies that (after fixing without loss of generality the potentials π i s i = 0 for all players i) there is a bijection between excess vectors and potentials. In particular, we obtain that for a given support the set of equilibria {x(λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]} has dimension at most one. Assuming that the dimensions is exactly one, the one-dimensional linear space {x(λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]} hits the boundaries of the support at exactly two points, uniquely defining two neighboring support sets. These support sets will form succ and pred of the current support set. To obtain a unique orientation, we show that it suffices to consider the determinant of the block Laplacian after erasing the row and columns corresponding to s i for each player i.
As a byproduct, we obtain an algorithm to solve the following problem of computing all Nash equilibria of an atomic splittable congestion game as a function of the players' demand rates:
Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable Input:
atomic splittable congestion game (G, K, l) with graph G = (V, E), commodities K = (s 1 , t 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (s k , t k , r k ) , and cost functions l e,i (x) = a e,i x + b e,i for some a e,i ∈ R >0 , b e,i ∈ R ≥0 . Output: piece-wise affine function f : [0, 1] → R mk such that f (λ) is a Nash equilibrium for demand rates r 1 λ, . . . , r k λ for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
To solve Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable, we simply run the trivial PPAD-algorithm that starts in the Nash equilibrium given by start. Then, it consecutively applies succ on the current state. During the course of the algorithm, it may be necessary to decrease λ, which leads to operations that are not reflected in the output of the algorithm. In these cases, we recall the maximal lambdaλ such that f has been outputted for [0,λ] and only proceed to output Nash equilibria onceλ is reached again. Not counting the space of the output (which may be exponential in the input), this algorithm can clearly be implemented in polynomial space.
Result 3 (cf. Theorem 8). Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in polynomial space.
For the special case of player-independent cost functions l e,i = l e,j for all e ∈ E and i, j ∈ [k], we can show that in our algorithm no decrease of λ is necessary. We then obtain the following.
Result 4 (cf. Theorem 9). Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in outputpolynomial time for non-b-degenerate atomic splittable congestion games with player-independent cost functions. In particular, the runtime is in O((kn) 2.4 + ν(kn) 2 ), where ν is the number of breakpoints of the piecewise affine function f returned by the algorithm.
Our analysis further allows to obtain the following corollaries regarding the multiplicity of equilibria.
Result 5 (cf. Corollaries 1 and 2, Example 1). There are games with infinitely many equilibria, but this does not occur when then coefficient a e,i are in general position. When the constants b e,i are in general position, the games have an odd number of Nash equilibria, except for a nullset of demands.
Related work. Atomic splittable congestion games can be seen as a coalitional version of Wardrop equilibria [52] where a finite set of player each controls a non-negligible amount of flow [28, 39] . The existence of pure Nash equilibria follows from standard fixed point arguments [34, 47] . Games with player-specific cost functions were studied by Orda et al. [44] who showed that Nash equilibria are unique in networks of parallel edges. Richman and Shimkin [46] characterized the set of twoterminal network topologies that are necessary and sufficient for uniqueness showing that equilibria are unique if and only if the networks are nearly parallel. The latter class of networks has been introduced by Milchtaich [43] to characterize the uniqueness of multi-class Wardrop equilibria. Harks and Timmermans [26] characterized the uniqueness of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games in terms of the combinatorial structure of the strategy set showing that equilibria are unique when the strategy space of each player is a bidirectional flow matroid. Bhaskar et al. [6] showed that edge flows in an atomic splittable game need not be unique even when the cost functions are player-independent. For games with cost functions that are monomials of degree at most three, edge flows are known to be unique [4] . The price of anarchy of atomic splittable congestion games has been studied by Cominetti et al. [12] , Harks [23] , and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [49] . Catoni and Pallottino [9] provided a paradox of a non-atomic game where replacing the non-atomic players of one commodity by an atomic player with the same demand decreases the overall performance of that commodity. Hayrapetyan et al. [29] and Bhaskar et al. [7] studied this effect in more detail.
Cominetti et al. [12] showed that for games with player-independent affine cost functions an equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a quadratic program. For special network topologies (including series-parallel graphs), Huang [32] gave a combinatorial algorithm. For the case of parallel links, Harks and Timmermans [25] gave a polynomial algorithm that computes the equilibrium of an atomic splittable congestion game with player-specific affine costs. Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [8] provided an exponential algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in games with player-independent convex costs. They also showed that some decision problem involving equilibria are NP-complete.
Further related are unsplittable congestion games [48] where each commodity chooses a single path of the network. For results on the existence of equilibria, see [2, 17, 20, 21, 24, 42, 48] . Computing a pure Nash equilibrium in a congestion game with unweighted players and playerindependent cost functions reduces to find the local minimum of a potential function and is, thus, contained in the complexity class PLS, the class of all local search problems with polynomially searchable neighborhoods as defined by [33] . Fabrikant et al. [19] and Ackermann et al [1] showed that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is in fact PLS-complete.
The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in an atomic splittable congestion game with player-specific affine costs may also be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP). Harks and Timmermans [25] show this explicitly for the singleton case, but it is not hard to convince ourselves that such a formulation is also possible in the general case by using the vertex potentials. However, it is not clear whether the resulting LCP belongs to any of the classes for which it is known that Lemke's algorithm terminates [3, 14, 18] . In addition, Lemke's algorithm introduces an artificial variable that is traced along the course of the algorithm. Our algorithm, in contrast, traces the equilibria along a meaningful increase of demand rates. In previous work [37] , we developed an algorithm that computes all Wardrop equilibria parametrized by the flow demand. While relying on a similar idea, Wardrop equilibria are much more easy to handle since they can be computed in polynomial time and are essentially unique. For further homotopy methods for computing equilibria, see [22, 30, 31, 35 ].
Preliminaries
An atomic splittable congestion game is a tuple (G, K, l) where G = (V, E) is a directed, weakly connected graph with n vertices V and m edges E, the family K = (s 1 , t 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (s k , t k , r k ) contains k triples each of which consisting of a source node s i ∈ V , a sink node t i ∈ V , and a demand rate r i ∈ R ≥0 for each of the k players, and l is a family of player-specific, strictly increasing affine linear cost functions l = (l e,i ) e∈E,i∈ [k] with l e,i (x) = a e,i x + b e,i for some a e,i ∈ R >0 and b e,i ∈ R ≥0 .
A feasible strategy for every player i ∈ [k] is to route her demand r i between her terminal vertices s i and t i . Thus, a strategy for player i is a s i -t i -flow of rate r i , i.e., a non-negative vector
≥0 containing the flow vectors of all players. We use the notation (x i , x −i ) for the strategy profile where player i uses the flowx i and all other players use their flow as in the strategy profile x. The cost l e,i experienced by the flow of the player i on some edge e depends on the total flowx = (x e ) e∈E wherex e = k i=1 x i e . Every player wants to minimize the total cost C i (x) experienced by the flow sent by this player, i.e., C i (x) = e∈E x i e l e,i (x e ). We say that x is a Nash equilibrium if for
The marginal total cost of player i on edge e given the flow x is given by
x i e l e,i (x e ) = l e,i (x e ) + x i e l ′ e,i (x e ) = a e,ixe + b e,i + a e,i x i e . We obtain the following characterization of Nash equilibria, see, e.g., Bhaskar et al. [6] for a reference. Lemma 1. The strategy profile x is a Nash equilibrium flow if and only if, for every player i, x i is a s i -t i -flow and e∈P µ i e (x) ≤ e∈Q µ i e (x) for all s i -t i -paths P, Q with x i e > 0 for all e ∈ P .
Lemma 1 states that x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if all path used by player i are also shortest path for that player with respect to the marginal costs. This enables us to give another characterization based on (shortest path) potentials.
The flow x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ [k] there is a potential vector
We denote the block flow vector with x = ((x 1 ) ⊤ , . . . , (x k ) ⊤ ) ⊤ and the block potential vector with π = ((π 1 ) ⊤ , . . . , (π k ) ⊤ ) ⊤ . For every edge e ∈ E, let S e ⊆ [k] be some subset of the players. Then we call the family S := (S e ) e∈E of all these sets a support. We say an edge e is active for player i if i ∈ S e , and e is inactive for player i otherwise. We say a Nash equilibrium x has the support S if for every edge e = (v, w) ∈ E, i ∈ S e implies that π i w −π i v = µ i e (x). Thus, S is a support of the Nash equilibrium x if for every active edge the inequality π i w − π i v ≤ µ i e (x) is satisfied with equality. In general, there are multiple supports for the same equilibrium, since for every player i, any edge with x i e = 0 and π i w − π i v = µ i e (x) can be considered to be an active or an inactive edge. Given a support of a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium flow can be obtained by solving the system of equations π i w − π i v = µ i e (x), i ∈ S e , e = (v, w) ∈ E for the unknowns π and x. For affine cost functions this reduces to a system of linear equations that can be solved explicitly. This will be the key element of our analysis and we discuss this in further detail in the next section.
Weighted Block Laplacians
In this section, we consider some fixed support S that is the support of some Nash equilibrium x. The goal is to express the multi-commodity excess vector y of the flow x as a linear system of the form y = L π − b, where π is the potential vector from Lemma 2. To this end, for any two players i, j ∈ [k] and any edge e ∈ E, let ω ij e := 1 if {i, j} ⊆ S e , and ω ij e := 0, otherwise. We also write ω i e as a shorthand for ω ii e . Further, let κ e := |S e | be the number of players using the edge e in S. We introduce the diagonal matrices Ω i := diag(ω i e 1 , . . . , ω i em ) for every player i ∈ [k] and the block diagonal matrix Ω that contains all Ω i as block diagonal elements. Further, we introduce the km × km block matrix K that contains blocks of size m × m, all being the diagonal matrix K := diag 1 κe 1 +1 , . . . , 1 κe m +1 . Finally, letC i := diag 1 a e 1 ,i , . . . , 1 a em ,i ∈ R m×m andC the km×km block diagonal matrix containing the matricesC i as diagonal blocks.
We define the matrices where I mk is the mk × mk identity matrix. Denote by G the kn × km block diagonal matrix that contains k copies of the incidence matrix Γ. Let 1 ∈ R n be the all-ones-vector. The matrix Γ has rank n − 1 by definition 2 and Γ ⊤ 1 = 0. Thus, the right left nullspace of the matrix G is
It is obvious that, if π is a potential for some Nash equilibrium x, then π + π ′ is a potential for the same flow for all π ′ ∈ N since the conditions of Lemma 2 depend only on potential differences. Therefore, it will be convenient to consider only potentials from the quotient space R nk /N . To this end, we define the vector space
where every potential is normalized such that the potential value of every player is 0 for the source vertex of the respective player. We refer to this subspace of R nk as the potential space. The potential space is isomorphic to R nk /N and has the advantage that the potentials π i v can be interpreted as the marginal costs of any s i -v i -path used by player i. Another technical problem with ambiguity can arise if not all vertices of G are connected by active edges for some player. In this case, the potential of that player can be changed on the connected components without changing the flow. To avoid this problem, we say a support S is a total support if, for every player i, the subgraph of G containing only edges e with i ∈ S e is connected. It is not hard to show, that there always exists a potential and some total support for any Nash equilibrium x and, hence, it is no restriction to consider total supports only. Proof. For the first claim, we observe that the matrixC is non-singular. Hence we only need to show that the matrix W ′ := (I mk − KΩ) is non-singular. Consider a row of W ′ . Every such row corresponds to a player i and an edge e. Now, we have two cases. If κ e = 0 (i.e., no player uses this edge) the row contains only a 1 as diagonal element. If κ e ≥ 1 the row contains 1 − 1 κe+1 ω i e as diagonal element and the off-diagonal elements 1 κe+1 ω ij e , j = i (all other elements are zero). Hence, the difference of diagonal elements and off-diagonal elements is
> 0 in this case. Overall, we conclude that W ′ is strictly diagonal dominant and, hence, non-singular. For the second claim, letW be the matrix obtained from W by removing all rows and columns corresponding to a player-edge-pair with i / ∈ S e . Further, letḠ be the matrix obtained from G by removing columns in the same way. Then the non-zero rows of CG ⊤ can be expressed asWḠ ⊤ .
With the same argumentation as for the first claim we obtain thatW is non-singular. Since S is a total support, we also know that ker(Ḡ ⊤ ) = N . Thus, the claim follows.
Finally, we can use the preceding technical definitions to obtain linear functions that give a connection between potential, flow, and excess vectors. Theorem 1. Let x be a Nash equilibrium flow with potential π and support S. Denote by y := G ⊤ x the multi-commodity excess vector. Then,
and
where L S := GCG ⊤ and b S := GCb. Further, we havex e = u ⊤ e,i KΩC G ⊤ π − b for all i ∈ [k], where u e,i is the unit vector corresponding to player i and edge e.
Proof. Given the Nash Equilibrium x and the potential π we obtain from Lemma 2, that for every
This system of linear equations is equivalent to the following system
. Denote by J ∈ R mk×m the block matrix that contains m copies of the m × m identity matrix I m . Then the above system can be expressed as
Using the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula, we obtain that
We observe that (ΩJ) ⊤ ΩJ = k j=1 Ω j = diag(κ e 1 , . . . , κ em ). Thus, the inverse I m +(ΩJ) ⊤ ΩJ −1 = diag (κ e 1 + 1) −1 , . . . , (κ em + 1) −1 =K exists. Finally, we note that the vector ρ can be written as ρ = ΩC(G ⊤ π − b). Overall, we obtain that
Since the excess vector of player i can be computed as y i = Γx i , we obtain the total excess vector as y = Gx establishing the second part of the theorem.
For the last part, we observe that the total flow on some edge e can be computed as follows.
For the step marked with ( * ) we use that the matrix KΩ the same rows for every fixed edge e and all players i. Further, we used that (κ e + 1)u ⊤ e,i K = k j=1 u e,i . Both facts follow directly from the definition of the respective matrices. Theorem 1 implies the following essential observations: Given a potential π we obtain a unique Nash flow x with Equation (1) and for every flow x we find a unique potential π in the potential space P (by Lemma 3). Further, every demand vector r induces naturally an excess vector y. Thus, we can solve Equation (2) to obtain a potential and then use Equation (1) to compute the Nash flow for the demand r if we know the right support S. Definition 1. For every support, we refer to the matrix L S := GCG ⊤ as the block Laplacian matrix of the support S.
We call L S block Laplacian because of the following observation. For a pair of players i and j, let us introduce the diagonal m × m matrices Then the matrix C contains the matrices C ii as diagonal blocks and the matrices −C ij as offdiagonal block elements. Hence, the matrix L S has the form
where every block L ij = ΓC ij Γ ⊤ is a weighted Laplacian matrix of G with weights C ij . Further, L S itself has the shape of a Laplacian matrix, but with Laplacian matrices rather than real values as entries. Lemma 3 implies that the linear mapping π → C G ⊤ π − b is injective (on P). If the same holds for the mapping π → L S π − b S then, given a support S, there is a unique Nash equilibrium for every demand r. This is in general not true in the case of player specific cost functions: There are examples with supports where the kernel of L is bigger than N implying that there are infinitely many potentials π ∈ P for Nash flows with the same demand r and, since the potential to flow mapping is injective on P, also infinitely many Nash flows for the same demand. See Example 1 in Section A.1 for a concrete example with infinitely many equilibria.
It is not hard to see that no support is a-degenerate if the coefficients a e,i are in general position. To see this, consider the matrix L S where all values a e,i of each player i are increased by ǫ i . Since the block diagonal matrices are Laplacians, there is no vector outside of ker(N ) that lets each of the ǫ i vanish, establishing that dim(ker(L S )) = dim(N ).
For any matrix A, we denote by A + any generalized inverse of A, that is a matrix A + satisfying AA + A = A. In particular, the vector A + b is solution for the system Ax = b whenever the system is consistent. For every non-a-degenerate support S, the equation y = L S π − b S has a unique solution in P, meaning there is a unique matrix L * such that the solution of the equation is L * (y + b S ). This particular generalized inverse can be obtained as follows: DefineL S to by the matrix obtained from L S be deleting rows and columns corresponding to the potentials π i s i for every player. Then compute the inverseL −1 S and add zero rows and columns for the previously deleted rows and columns. It is easy to show thatL S is non-singular and that L * S is indeed a generalized inverse of L S that maps into P.
Membership in PPAD
In this section, we show that Nash-Atomic-Splittable is contained in PPAD. To this end, we define the set of states S as well as the polynomial functions start, succ and pred. The high-level idea can be described as follows: We consider the equilibria of the game for all possible demand rates λr with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then the states of S are all supports that are used for some demand rate λr. As it will turn out, every support is valid for some interval [λ min S , λ max S ] and at the end of every interval, we can find another support that is valid on another interval intersecting with the previous one only in the boundary point. In this way, we can define the predecessor and successor functions pred and succ and obtain a solution as soon as 1 ∈ [λ min S , λ max S ] for some support S. Let r = (r 1 , . . . , r k ) be the vector of all demand rates. Then, the excess direction is the vector ∆y defined as
We say a potential π has the support S if π and its induced flow x (that is the unique x satisfying Equation 1) satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2. Thus, in particular, if π has the support S, then the induced flow x is a Nash equilibrium (for some demand). Further, we call an arbitrary potential vector π ∈ P a λ-potential if it induces a flow x that is a Nash equilibrium for the demand vector λr. For every support S, we define the values τ S e,i := −1 if i ∈ S e and τ S e,i := 1 if i / ∈ S e . For every player i ∈ [k], let T i := diag(τ S e 1 ,i , . . . , τ S em,i ) and let T be the km × km block diagonal matrix with the blocks T i on the diagonal. Then we can characterize λ-potentials with support S as follows.
Lemma 4.
A vector π ∈ P is a λ-potential with support S if and only if
Proof. For any arbitrary potential π, let x := x(π) be the flow given by Equation (1) (if π is the potential of some Nash equilibrium flow x then x = x(π) by Theorem 1). Consider the vector W S (G ⊤ π − b) ∈ R km . This vector has a component for every pair of players and edges. Fix some player i and some edge e and consider the component of this vector corresponding to this pair, this is
where u e,i is the unit vector corresponding to this player edge pair. We distinguish two cases. First, assume i ∈ S e . Then, since
On the other hand, assume that i / ∈ S e . Then,
Finally, let π be a potential for some Nash flow x with support S. Then λ∆y = L S π − b S is satisfied by Theorem 1. Further, for every i ∈ S e , we obtain
and, for every i ∈ S e ,
On the other hand, if we have some potential π that satisfies the conditions, then the flow x := x(π) given by Equation (1) is a flow for demand λr by definition that satisfies all conditions of Lemma 2. Hence, this x(π) is an equilibrium flow.
By Lemma 4, the polytope
contains all potentials with support S. We call a total support S feasible if P S = ∅. Every feasible support admits a Nash equilibrium for the demand λr for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. A game is called a-degenerate if there is a feasible support that is a-degenerate. For the remainder of this section, we will assume that every game is non-a-degenerate. We will discuss how to deal with a-degenerate games in Section A.1. For non-a-degenerate games, L S is invertible on P implying that for fixed λ there is at most one equilibrium per support. The thick edges with the same color are serial-dependent. In particular, e1 is closer to the marked vertex v * than e2, as well as e3 is closer to v * than e4 and e5.
Corollary 1. Every non-a-degenerate game has a finite number of Nash equilibria.
Before we can define the state set of our PPAD-graph, we have to care about one further source of ambiguity. Consider for example the network from Figure 1a . If there is one player with source s and sink t, there are, even if we restrict ourselves to total supports, two different potentials that induce the same flow (in this example the flow x = (0, 0, 0) ⊤ ). In particular these two potentials belong to different supports. This ambiguity makes it harder to define predecessor and successor functions in a well-defined way. To avoid this problem, we will restrict ourselves to special potentials-namely potentials that can be interpreted as shortest path potentials of the players. To ensure that all potentials are shortest path potentials, we restrict ourselves to certain supports, which we will characterize with the following definition.
We say in any graph
the edge-cut induced by V contains exactly one incoming and one outgoing edge, and these cut edges are exactly e and e ′ . For some vertex v and two serial-dependent edges e, e ′ we say e is closer to v than e ′ if there is a subset of vertices Figure 1b for an illustration of these definitions.
We say a total support S is a shortest-path-support if the following holds for all players i: If e and e ′ are serial-dependent in the graph G and e is closer to s i than e then the edge e is active for player i, i.e., i ∈ S e . In fact, it is not hard to show that if S is a shortest-path-support and π ∈ P S , then π contains the length of shortest paths for all players to all vertices 3 with respect to the edge lengths a i ex e (π) + b i e , where x(π) is the flow induced by potential π via Equation (1) from Theorem 1. Regarding the example from Figure 1a , observe that the edges (s, v) and (v, t) are serial-dependent, since δ
is active are shortest path supports which excludes the second support in the rightmost graph.
We define the set
of feasible, non-a-degenerate supports admitting shortest path potentials π only. We then use the set S as the states of our PPAD-graph. Given any state, i.e., support S ∈ S, we now have to find predecessors and successors of these states in polynomial time. To this end, we observe that every polytope is just a line segment that has some direction ∆π S with some fixed orientiation σ S and some endpoints π min S and π max S that we call boundary potentials. Each of the two boundary potentials will be also feasible in some other P S ′ for some other support S ′ . We will then use these supports as predecessors and successors, while the orientation σ S determines which one is which. We continue by formalizing this idea. Definition 3. Let S ∈ S. Then the sign σ S := sgn(det(L S )) ∈ {−1, +1} is called the orientation of S. Further, we call the vector ∆π S := σ S L * S ∆y the potential direction of S.
For every pair of edge-player-pair (e, i) ∈ E ×[k] we denote by u e,i the unit-vector corresponding to the pair (e, i) and, for every support S, define the vectors
The vector w S,e,i is the normal vector of the hyperplane induced by u ⊤ e,i T S W S (G ⊤ π − b) ≤ 0 which is a boundary of P S . Further, as we already have seen in the proof of Lemma 4, for any potential π, w ⊤ S,e,i π is either the flow of player i on edge e if i ∈ S e , or w ⊤ S,e,i π is the difference of the marginal cost of player i on edge e and the potential difference on this edge indicating "how inactive" the edge e is for player i. The vector w ′ S,e,i is essentially the same vector without the factor τ S e,i and the weights 1/a e,j from the matrixC and will be used later to establish the connection of the block Laplacians of different supports. We divide all edge-player-pairs (e, i) into groups
which consist of pairs for which the left-hand side of the corresponding inequality in P S increases, decreases, or is unchanged when moving along the direction ∆π S . (For active edges the quantity σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S be explicitly interpreted as the change of flow of player i on edge e when moving along the direction ∆π S , i.e., when increasing or decreasing the demand of all players.) Finally, we define for all (e, i) / 
The polytope P S is bounded by the inequalities
These inequalities are equivalent to λ ≤λ S,e,i for all (e, i) ∈ E + S and λ ≥λ S,e,i for all (e, i) ∈ E − S . Hence, the claim follows.
The potential polytopes of continuative neighbors. . All potentials on this line segment induce Nash equilibria for demands λr with λ min
The polytope PS 1 of some support S1 with the polytopes of two continuative neighbors. The boundary potentials π of the neighboring supports coincide. The polytopes are separated by hyperplanes with normalvector wS,e,i. In this example, support S2 has negative orientation σS 2 < 0, since ∆πS 2 is directed away from the maximum boundary potential.
The two special potentials π min
are the extreme points of P S by definition. We also refer to these points as boundary potentials of S and call ∂S := {π min S , π max S } the boundary of S. The vector σ S ∆π S is directed from π min S to π max S while the actual potential direction ∆π S may be oriented in opposite direction if the orientation is negative. We will use this later when defining predecessor and successor supports. See Figure 2 (a) for an illustration of these results. In order to find successor and predecessor supports, we introduce the notion of neighboring supports. These are supports S, S ′ where the activity state of exactly one edge differs in S and S ′ for exactly one player. Since the line segments P S and P S ′ of two continuatively neighboring supports intersect in boundary potentials of the respective supports, a continuative neighbor of S continues the line segment P S . We proceed by proving a technical relation of the matrices C of two neighboring supports and then show that we can easily identify all continuative neighbors of a supports. Lemma 6. Let S and S ′ be (e, i)-neighbors. Then, In particular, we have w S ′ ,e,i = − κ S e +1 κ S ′ e +1 w S,e,i . Proof. First, we make the following observations: The only difference between S and S ′ is by definition the different status of edge e for player i. Thus, ω i ′ e ′ (S ′ ) = ω i ′ e ′ (S) whenever e ′ = e or i ′ = i and ω i e (S ′ ) = ω i e (S) + τ S e,i . Thus, also Ω S ′ differs only in one value from Ω S and we get
Further, the number of players using an edge is unchanged for all edges but e. Hence ,
where u e denotes the m-dimensional unit vector that corresponds to edge e. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we write K S = JK S J ⊤ where J is the km × m block matrix that contains k copies of the m × m identity matrix. Then, in particular,
Overall, all this yields
Now, consider anyẽ = e and some j ∈ [k]. Then, κ S ′ e = κ S e . This implies that K S uẽ ,j = K S ′ uẽ ,j . Using again that Ω S ′ = Ω S + u e,i u ⊤ e,i T S , this yields
Further, for any j ∈ [k], we get
and, thus,
We note that, by definition, W S = (I km − K S Ω S )C. Using this and the two equalities shown above (ii) and (iii) follow.
The in particular part follow directly by the definition of the vector w and τ S ′ e,i = −τ S ′ e,i . 
i.e., the flow induced by π is the same for both potentials.
Proof. Let (e, i) be a edge-player-pair withλ S,e,i = λ min S . Then, by definition ofλ S,e,i the inequality in P S corresponding to (e, i) is tight in π = π min S , i.e.,
Note, that since T S is non-singular, this implies u ⊤ e,i W S (G ⊤ π − b) = 0 and, using the definition of W S , we obtain
In order to show that π ∈ P S ′ we have to confirm that the inequalities T S ′ W S ′ (G ⊤ π − b) ≤ 0 are satisfied. Using Lemma 6(iii), we directly get that all inequalities corresponding to edgesẽ = e are still satisfied since the left-hand-side is the same for S and S ′ . The inequality corresponding to the pair e, i is also satisfied since
Finally, we consider the inequalities corresponding to edges e and players j = i. For these pairs, we obtain
which implies that π = π min S satisfies all inequalities of P S ′ , i.e., π min S ∈ P S ′ . Since the inequality corresponding to the pair (e, i) also tight for S ′ , π min S ∈ ∂S ′ . If we assume, thatλ S,e,i = λ min S , then the inequality for the pair (e, i) is not tight and we obtain
Thus, in this case π min S / ∈ P S ′ and in particular π min S / ∈ ∂S ′ . Overall, we established claim (i). Claim (ii) follows with the same proof.
Finally, if π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′ , then
and, hence, π induces the same flow with respect to both supports S and S ′ .
Lemma 7 shows that whenever in a boundary potential π ∈ ∂S the inequality corresponding to an edge-player-pair (e, i) is tight (i.e.,λ S,e,i = λ min S orλ S,e,i = λ max S ) then π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′ where S ′ is the (e, i)-neighbor S ′ . Thus, if S ′ is also a shortest-path-support, then S ′ is a continuative neighbor of S. See Figure 2 The continuative neighbors are the candidates for the predecessor and successor of the support. Although restricting to shortest-path-supports eliminates many cases where there exists more than one continuative neighbor, there can still be some ambiguity. In order to have uniquely defined predecessors and successors, we make the following non-degeneracy assumption.
A game is called b-degenerate game if there is a feasible, non-a-degenerate shortest-path-support that is b-degenerate. For the remainder of this section, we assume that every game is non-bdegenerate and will present a method to handle b-degenerate games in Section A.2. Using Lemma 7 we can show that whenever a boundary potential is not a 0-or a 1-potential, there is a neighboring shortest-path-support that is a continuative neighbor. is a 1-potential. Thus, for every boundary potential that does not a starting or a solution potential, we find a continuative neighbor.
Proof. Assume that for S ∈ S, we have that N min S = ∅. This can happen because of two reasons. Either no (e, i)-inequality is tight and 0 determines the maximum in the definition of λ min S , or some (e, i)-inequality is tight. In the first case, π min S is a 0-potential as claimed. In the latter case, we have one or more tight inequalities corresponding to some edge-player-pairs (e, i). By Lemma 7 all (e, i)-neighbors S ′ of S satisfy ∂S ∩ ∂S = ∅. Since we assume that none of these supports is a continuative neighbor, all these supports are not shortest path supports. Since S is a shortest path potential, we know that all these neighbors are must have one more inactive edge than S (by adding a new active edge to a shortest path support, the new support can only be also shortest-path by definition). In particular, this inactived edge e must be serial-dependent of some other edge e ′ , and e must be closer to s i than e ′ . By definition, the same s i -t i paths use the edges e and e ′ , and hence the flow as well as the flow change on these edges must always be the same. Thus, the inequality of e ′ must be tight as well. This means, if we have to inactivate some edge that is in serial dependence of another edge, we can always inactivate both. In particular, we can inactivate the last of all serial-dependent edges and therefore preserve the shortest-path-property of the support. Thus N min S = ∅ in this case. The same arguments also hold for the case N max
With the non-b-degeneracy assumption, there always is a unique, continuative neighbor for every boundary potential that does not induce the zero flow or a solution flow for demand r. Hence, we can define lower neighbor function as
the upper neighbor function N max (S) is defined likewise. By non-b-degeneracy, these functions are well-defined. The functions N min and N max are natural candidates for the predecessor and successor functions. The last issue we have to address is that the functions must be defined in a "compliant" way, i.e, they must defined such that pred(succ(S)) = S. The next theorem relates the block Laplacians (and their generalized inverses) of two neighboring supports and shows that the oriented potential directions ∆π S of two neighboring supports are always "compliant", meaning that they are always oriented in the same way with respect to the hyperplane seperating the polytopes P S of the neighboring supports (see Figure 2b ). Theorem 2. Let S, S ′ ∈ S be two (e, i)-neighboring supports and let w S,e,i and w ′ S ′ ,e,i be the vectors as defined above. Then, (i) the Laplacian matrices satisfy
(ii) the generalized inverses of the block Laplacians satisfy
(iii) the potential directions satisfy
Proof. For (i) we observe that by Lemma 6
Consider the matrixL S , obtained from L S by deleting the rows and columns corresponding to the source vertex respective source vertex for every player. Letŵ S,e,i andŵ ′ S ′ ,e,i be the vectors w S,e,i and w ′ S ′ ,e,i , respectively, without the rows belonging to the source vertex for every player. Then L S is non-singular, since we assume S is non-a-degenerate, andL S =L S ′ + w ′ S ′ ,e,i w S,e,i we obtain
We note that the term v ⊤ L + S v is independent of the choice of the generalized inverse L + S for any vector v belonging to the row-and column space of L [27, Theorem 9.4.1]. Thus, we obtain
where L * S is the generalized inverse of L S obtained fromL S by adding the appropriate zero rows and columns.
As we assume non-a-degeneracy, the determinants det(L S ) and det(L S ′ ) are non-zero. We then obtain (9) with the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula for generalized inverses (see, e.g., [27, Theorem 18.2.14] ).
Using the identity (9) and w S ′ ,e,i = − κ S e +1 κ S ′ e +1 w S,e,i from Lemma 6, we get
which, by applying the sign-function to both sides, proves (10) .
Finally, we can define the predecessor function pred : S → S ∪ {∅} and a successor function succ : S → S ∪ {∅} by Proof. First, we note that in the non-b-degenerate case the functions N max and N min are welldefined and computable in polynomial time since the neighbor support or the fact that no neighbor exists can be found by solving min (e,i)∈E + Sλ S,e,i and max (e,i)∈E − Sλ S,e,i . Further, the orientation σ S can be found by computing the determinant of the matrixL S Let S and S ′ be continuative, (e, i)-neighboring supports. Then, by the definition of pred, succ, N min , N max , N min S , N max S , λ min S , and λ max S , it is easy to see that w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S < 0 ⇔ S ′ = pred(S) and w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S > 0 ⇔ S ′ = succ(S).
Assume that S ′ = pred(S) = ∅. Then, w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S < 0. Further, we know from Theorem 2, that sgn(w ⊤ S ′ ,e,i ∆π S ′ ) = − sgn(w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S ). Thus, we get τ S ′ e,i w ⊤ S ′ ,e,i ∆π S ′ > 0. But this means, again by (12) , that S = succ(S ′ ) = succ(pred(S)). With the same reasoning we obtain also pred(succ(S)) = S if succ(S) = ∅.
Finally, we want to define the function start that yields a support S ∈ S with no predecessor and a successor. Let S 0 be the total support of the zero flow x 0 := 0 which is a Nash equilibrium for the demand r = 0. By the non-b-degeneracy assumption, this must be the unique support for the zero flow x 0 . If there were two supports for the zero flow, then both of them would be continuative neighbors for any of their successors, contradicting the non-b-degeneracy. Recall that an edge e is in the support of some player i if the potentials and the marginal cost satisfy π i w − π i v = µ i e (x). In particular, the potential of the zero flow x 0 can be easily obtained by computing the shortest path potentials with respect to the edge offsets b i e and hence we can easily determine the support S 0 .
Lemma 10. For a non-b-degenerate game, let S 0 ∈ S be the unique support for the Nash Equilibrium x 0 = 0 for the demand 0. Then, (i) the orientation of S 0 is positive, i.e., σ S 0 > 0,
(ii) S 0 has no predecessor, i.e., pred(S 0 ) = ∅.
(iii) either there is a Nash equilibrium x for demand r with the support S 0 or succ(S 0 ) = ∅.
Proof. Denote by E i := {e ∈ E : i ∈ S 0 e } the active edges for the player i. By the non-b-degeneracy assumption, the set E i is a spanning tree of the graph G. In fact, if there was a cycle in E i , removing any edge in the cycle from active edges of player i would yield a total support S ′ such that the shortest potential π 0 of the Nash equilibrium x 0 is also feasible in P S ′ . This is a contradiction since, as argued above, the support in a non-b-degenerate game is unique.
For every pair (e, i) with i / ∈ S 0 e , the matrix C S 0 has a zero row and zero column by definition. If we defineC S 0 to be the matrix C S 0 without these zero rows and zero columns and defineḠ to be the matrix obtained from G by deleting the corresponding columns from G, we have that
From the proof of Lemma 3 we know that C S 0 is strictly diagonal dominant except for the zero rows. Thus,C S 0 is strictly diagonal dominant and has therefore a positive determinant. Let G be the matrix obtained fromḠ by deleting all rows corresponding to source vertices of the respective players. Then it is easy to show thatĜ is a quadratic matrix with det(Ĝ) = ±1 and thatL S 0 =ĜC S 0Ĝ ⊤ . Hence,
By definition, the potential π 0 must be the boundary potential π min S 0 , thus, by definition of pred, and N S , and (i), we obtain pred(S 0 ) = ∅. By non-b-degeneracy and σ S 0 > 0, we know that π max S 0 is distinct from π 0 . With Lemma 8, the last claim follows.
We have defined polynomial time computable functions start, pred, and succ and the state set S. Since there is a unique support S 0 for the zero flow, every other sink in the PPAD-graph must contain a 1-potential and is thus a solution of the problem. Hence, we have established the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Nash-Atomic-Splittable is in PPAD.
We obtain the following corollary which mirrors a similar result for non-degenerated bimatrix games. For the proof, we use that support changes appear only for a nullset of demands since there are only finitly many supports. This implies that except for a nullset of demands, the equilibria appear in the relative interior of the polytopes P S for some supports S. This further implies that these equilibria are all unique startpoints or endpoints of a PPAD-paths. Subtracting the artificial equilibrium at λ = 0, we have shown that there is an odd number of equilibria.
Corollary 2.
A non-b-degenerate atomic splittable congestion game has an odd number of Nash equilibria except for a nullset of demands.
PPAD-hardness
In this section, we show that it is PPAD-hard to compute an equilibrium in an integer-splittable congestion game with affine player-specific costs.
To prove that computing an equilibrium is PPAD-hard, we reduce from the problem of computing an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in Win-Lose-Games.
Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game
Input:
matrices U, V ∈ {0, 1} n×n , ǫ > 0 Output: strategiesȳ,z ∈ R n ≥0 with n j=1ȳ j = n j=1z j = 1 such that y ⊤ Uz ≤ȳ ⊤ Uz + ǭ y ⊤ Vz ≤ȳ ⊤ Vz + ǫ for all strategies y, z.
The following result is due to Chen et al. [11] .
Theorem 4 (Chen et al. [11] ). For any constant β > 0, Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game for matrices U, V ∈ {0, 1} n×n and ǫ = n −β is PPAD-complete.
We show the following result.
Theorem 5. Nash-Atomic-Splittable is PPAD-hard.
Proof. We reduce from Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game. Let (U, V) be a win-lose game for some matrices U, V ∈ {0, 1} n×n . We proceed to describe the construction of a corresponding atomic splittable congestion games (G U,V , {1, 2}, l) with two players with demands d 1 = d 2 = 1. The macro structure of the underlying graph G U,V is shown in Figure 3a . We note that our construction uses constant cost functions (in particular cost functions with constant cost 0) for the benefit of a simpler exposition. It is not hard to see that the same construction is valid for cost functions with non-constant functions with very small slopes a e,i = ǫ for a very small ǫ > 0.
There are n 2 gadgets G r,c with r, c ∈ [n] that are arranged in a grid like fashion. The horizontal edges of the grid as well as the edges connecting s 1 and t 1 to the grid, shown dashed and blue in Figure 3a , have constant cost 0 for player 1 and constant cost 2n for player 2. We call these edges type-1 auxiliary edges. Similarly, the vertical edges of the grid as well as the edges connecting s 2 and t 2 to the grid, shown dot-dashed and red in Figure 3a have constant cost 2n for player 1 and constant cost 0 for player 2. These edges are called type-2 auxiliary edges. Every gadget G r,c with r, c ∈ {1, . . . , n} has four designated vericess r ,t r ,s c ,t c . In the macro structure, incoming auxiliary type-1 edges to G r,c from the left are connected tos r , incoming auxiliary type-2 edges from above are connected tos c , outgoing auxiliary type-1 edges to the right are connected tot r , and outgoing auxiliary type-2 edges to below are connected tot c . Every gadget G r,c has T type-1 main edges e 1 r,c,1 , . . . , e 1 r,c,T and T type-2 main edges e 2 r,c,1 , . . . , e 2 r,c,T as well as some auxiliary edges, see Figure 3b . The dashed blue edges are type-1 auxiliary edges that have constant cost 0 for player 1 and constant cost 4n for player 2 while the dash-dotted red edges are type-2 auxiliary edges that have constant cost 4n for player 1 and constant cost 0 for player 2. The structure of G r,c is such that every path froms r tot r that does not use type-2 auxiliary edges uses exactly one of the type-1 main edges e 1 r,c,1 , . . . , e 1 r,c,T and all type-2 main edges {e r,c,1 , . . . , e 2 r,c,T }. Similarly, every path froms c tot c that does not use any of the type-1 auxiliary edges uses exactly one of the type-2 main edges e 2 r,c,1 , . . . , e 2 r,c,T as well as all of the type-1 main edges {e 1 r,c,1 , . . . , e 1 r,c,T }. For the type-1 and type-2 main edges, we define the player-specific affine costs as follows. We claim that in equilibrium, player 1 does not use any of the auxiliary type-2 edges and player 1 does not use any of the auxiliary type-1 edges. Claim 1. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of (G U,V , {1, 2}, l). Then, x 1 e = 0 for every type-2 auxiliary edge e and x 2 e = 0 for every type-1 auxiliary edge.
Proof of Claim 1. We show the claim only for player 1 since the argumentation for player 2 is symmetrical. By Lemma 1, player 1 only uses paths with minimal marginal costs in x. The marginal cost of any path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge e is at least a e,ixe + b e,i + a e,i x i e ≥ 4n.
On the other hand, every path that does not contain a type-2 auxiliary edge traverses all gadgets G r,1 , . . . , G r,n for some r ∈ [n]. In each gadget, G r,c with c ∈ [n], player 1 traverses one of the type-1 main edges e r,c,tc with t c ∈ [T ] as well as some type-1 auxiliary edges and some type-2 main edges each of which have no cost for player-1. Thus, the marginal cost of the path is determined by the n type-1 main edges. Let E r = {e 1 r,c,tc | c ∈ [n]} be the set of these edges. The marginal cost of the path is then given by e∈Er a e,ixe + b e,i + a e,i x i e ≤ e∈Erx e + x e,i ≤ 3n.
We conclude that every path of player 1 not containing a type-2 auxiliary edge has lower marginal cost than a path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge and the claim follows.
Notice that player 1 has an exponential number of paths from s 1 to t 1 that do not use any of the type-2 edges. Every such path visits one row of gadgets G r,1 , . . . , G r,n for some r ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Within each gadget G r,c , c ∈ {1, . . . , n} the path uses one of the T type-1 main edges e 1 r,c,1 , . . . , e 1 r,c,T . We claim that in equilibrium, all paths that visit the same row of gadgets have the same flow of player 1. Proof of Claim 2. We show the claim only for player 1 since the argumentation for player 2 is symmetrical. Let r, c ∈ [n] and t, t ′ ∈ [T ] be arbitrary and consider the edges e = e 1 r,c,t and e ′ = e 1 r,c,t ′ . Since x is a Nash equilibrium, by Claim 1, we may assume that player 1 does not use any type-2 auxiliary edges and player 2 does not use any type-1 auxiliary edges. Since every path of player 2 that does not use any type-1 auxiliary edges and traverses the gadget G r,c uses all type-1 main edges, this implies in particular that x 2 e = x 2 e ′ . If x 1 e = x 1 e ′ = 0, there is nothing left to show, so it i s without loss of generality to assume that x 1 e > 0. This implies that there is a path P from s 1 to t 1 carrying positive flow. Let P ′ the path that uses the same edges as P except that in gadget G r,c edge e ′ is used instead of edge e. (This means that also some auxiliary type-1 edges are swapped in G r,c but since they have no cost for player 1, we may ignore them for the following arguments.) Lemma 1 implies
which is equivalent to
using the definition of the cost functions. Further using that x 2 e = x 2 e ′ and that 1 − u r,c ≥ 0 this implies x 1 e ≤ x 1 e ′ and, thus, x 1 e ′ > 0. We conclude that (13) is actually satisfied with equality implying that x 1 e = x 1 e ′ . For player 1 and r ∈ {1, . . . , n} let x 1 r denote the total flow sent along the paths using the rth gadget row G r,1 , . . . , G r,n . Similarly, for player 2 and c ∈ {1, . . . , n} let x 2 c denote the total flow sent along the paths using the cth gadget column G 1,c , . . . , G n,c . Claim 3. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of (G U,V , {1, 2}, l) with T = 2n β+1 for some β > 0. Then, the strategy profile (ȳ,z) withȳ r = x 1 r for all r ∈ [n] andz c = x 2 c for all c ∈ [n] is an n −β -approximate Nash equilibrium of (U, V).
Proof of Claim 3. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that (ȳ,z) is not an n −β -approximate Nash equilibrium of (U, V). Due to symmetry, it is without loss of generality to assume that player 1 has an alternative strategy y with y ⊤ Uz >ȳ ⊤ Uz + n −β . This implies in particular that 
Let r * ∈ arg max r∈[n] c∈[n] u r,czc and let r ′ ∈ argmin r∈[n]:ȳr>0 n c=1 u r,czc be arbitrary. Since x is a Nash equilibrium for G U,V , all used path have the same marginal total cost, and unused path have higher marginal total cost. Using Claim 2, this implies in particular that
Using the definition of (ȳ,z) we obtain
Finally, we obtain
contradicting (14) .
Using that it is PPAD-complete to compute an n −β -approximate equilibrium of a two-player win-lose game for any β > 0, we conclude that the computation of equilibrium of a atomic-splittable congestion game is PPAD-hard as well.
With the same arguments, we can also show that the computation of a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is PPAD-complete. A multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is a multi-commodity flow that satisfies the characterization via shortest path potentials of Lemma 2 for the original cost functions l e,i instead for the marginal cost functions µ i e , i.e, x is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ [k] there is a potential vector π i with π i w − π i v = l e,i (x e ) if x i e > 0, and π i w − π i v ≤ l e,i (x e ) if x i e = 0 for all e = (v, w) ∈ E. We prove the following result settling an open question in [41] . Theorem 6. Computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium for commodity-specific affine costs is PPAD-hard.
Proof. We use a similar construction as in the proof of Theorem 5 with the only exception that player 1 is replaced by a population of players of size 1 and player 2 is replaced by a population of players of size 1.
Claim 4. Let x be a Wardrop equilibrium of (G U,V , {1, 2}, l) . Then x 1 e = 0 for every type-2 auxiliary edge e and x 2 e = 0 for every type-1 auxiliary edge e.
Proof of Claim 4. We again show the claim only for population 1 since the argumentation for population 2 is symmetric. In a Wardrop equilibrium only paths with minimum cost are used. The total cost of any path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge e is at least 4n. On the other hand, every path that does not contain a type-2 edge contains n type-1 main edges contained in some set
. The total cost of these edges is equal to
so that we conclude that no path containing a type-2 edge is used in a Wardrop equilibrium.
We proceed to show that population i chooses all type-i main edges within a gadget G r,c with the same flow. Proof of Claim 5. We again show the result only for population 1 since the argumentation for population 2 is symmetric. Let r, c ∈ [n] and t, t ′ ∈ [T ] be arbitrary and consider the type-1 main edges e = e 1 r,c,t and e = e 1 r,c,t ′ in gadget G r,c . Using Claim 4, no population i uses auxiliary edges that are not of type i. This implies in particular that the flow of population 2 on edges e and e ′ is equal, i.e., x 2 e = x 2 e ′ . If x 1 e = x 1 e ′ = 0 there is nothing left to show, so it is without loss of generality to assume that x 1 e > 0. This implies that there is a path P from s 1 to t 1 carrying positive flow. Let P ′ be the path that uses the same edges as P except that in gadget G r,c the type-1 main edge e ′ is used instead of edge e. The equilibrium condition of Wardrop flows implies that
Using the definition of the cost functions, this is equivalent to
Further using that x 2 e = x 2 e ′ this implies that x 1 e ≤ x 1 e ′ and, thus, x 1 e ′ > 0. We conclude that (15) was satisfied with equality implying that x 1 e = x 1 e ′ .
For population 1 and r ∈ [n], let x 1 r denote the total flow sent along the paths using the rth gadget row G r,1 , . . . , G r,n . Similarly, define x 2 c as the total flow sent by population 2 along the paths in the cth gadget column G 1,c , . . . , G n,c . Claim 6. Let x be a Wardrop equilibrium of (G U,V , {1, 2}, l) with T = n β+1 for some β > 0. Then, the strategy profile (ȳ,z) withȳ r = x 1 r for all r ∈ [n] andz c = x 2 c for all c ∈ [n] is an n −β -approximate Nash equilibrium of (U, V). Lemma 11. If the coefficients of the cost functions l e,i are independent of the player i, then, for any total support S, (i) L S is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
(ii) ker(L S ) = N .
Proof. If we consider symmetric cost functions, then the block-diagonal matrixC contains k-times the same blockC
. By definition, the matrix K S is a k × k-block matrix containing all the same blocksK S . Hence, we obtain K SC =CK S . The matrix K S is, as well as the diagonal matrices Ω S andC, symmetric. Further, the diagonal matricesC and Ω S commute. This yields
Thus, C ⊤ S and also L S = GC S G ⊤ are symmetric matrices. Further, the matrix W S has diagonal elements 1 ae 1 − 1 κe+1 ω i e and off-diagonal elements 0 or − 1 ae(κe+1) ω ij e . This means, W S is strictly diagonal-dominant. (In the non-symmetric case, this only holds for the matrix (I km − KΩ S ) as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.) This implies that the matrix C S is weakly diagonal dominant and symmetric, and thus positive semi-definite. This implies that L S = GC S G ⊤ is positive semidefinite, as well.
Finally, since C S is symmetric and positive semi-definite, we have that GC S G ⊤ v = 0 if and only if C S G ⊤ v = 0. Thus, with Lemma 3, the second claim follows.
Sylvester's criterions states that a matrix is positive semi-definite if and only if all principal minors of that matrix are positive semi-definite. Thus, by Lemma 11, the principal minor σ S = det(L S ) is non-negative. Additionally, Lemma 11(ii) implies that all supports are non-a-degenerate. Thus σ S > 0, and we obtain Theorem 7. If the coefficients of the cost functions l e,i are independent of the player i, then (i) σ S > 0 for every total support S. In particular, the game is non-a-degenerate.
(ii) For every demand vector r, there is a unique Nash equilibrium x.
Proof. We have already argued above that σ S > 0. Assume that for some demand r there are two different Nash equilibrium flows x and x ′ . Then there must be also two different potentials π, π ′ ∈ P for these equilibria. These potentials must lie in different polytopes P S , i.e., the equilibria x, x ′ must have different supports S and S ′ . Otherwise, if π, π ∈ P S , then, since P S is convex, there would be infinitely many equilibria (namely the convex combinations of x, x ′ ) with support S, implying that S is a-degenerate which is a contradiction to Theorem 7.
Thus, there must be two supports S and S ′ that admit equilibria for demand r. But since all supports have positive orientation σ S > 0, and the predecessor and successor functions are always well defined, we can follow two independent paths back to λ = 0. Hence, we also have two different supports for the zero flow. For a non-b-degenerate game, this is a contradiction. But even if the game is b-degenerate, the assumption would imply that for very small perturbation ε as described in Section A.2, the perturbed game still has two equilibria with different supports for the same demand. But, as argued in Section A.2, we know that this game must be non-b-degenerate and, thus, we again obtain a contradiction and the claim follows.
Parametric computation
Using the trivial PPAD-algorithm, beginning with the support given by start, we can iterate through (possibly exponentially many) supports using the function pred, until we eventually obtain the support S for the Nash equilibrium for the demand r.
As a byproduct of this procedure, we obtain a sequence of supports S 0 , . . . , S ν , where S l is the support of Nash equilibria for demands λr with λ ∈ [λ min S l , λ max S l ]. By construction of the successor function, we know that ν l=0 [λ min S l , λ max S l ] = [0, 1]. Thus, we can define a function λ → S(λ) that maps every λ to a support of some Nash equilibrium for demand λr. Given the support S(λ) and λ, we can easily compute a Nash equilibrium for the demand λ with the formulas in Theorem 1. Hence, we obtain a function f : [0, 1] → R mk such that f (λ) is a Nash equilibrium for the demand λr, i.e., a function solving Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable.
Theorem 8. Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in polynomial space.
Proof. Since the function λ → π(λ) that maps a value λ to the potential of a Nash equilibrium for demand λr is linear for every support (see Lemma 5) , and flows depend linearly on the potentials, the function f is piecewise-linear. Thus, it is enough to compute the potentials at the breakpoints λ min S , λ max S explicitly. For any support, this can be clearly done in polynomial time. Since the functions start and succ can be computed in polynomial time as well, Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be computed in polynomial space.
A game has unique equilbria for all demands if and only if, for every feasible support S, we have σ S > 0. In this case, the function f computes all Nash Equilibria of the game. If, in addition, the game is non-b-degenerate, then every support corresponds to a breakpoint of the piecewise affine function f , yielding an output polynomial algorithm. Using Theorem 7 this implies in particular an output-polynomial algorithm for the parametric Nash equilibrium problem for player-independent costs.
Theorem 9. Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in output-polynomial time for non-b-degenerate games with σ S > 0 for all feasible supports S. In particular, the runtime is in O((kn) 2.4 +ν(kn) 2 ), where ν is the number of breakpoints of the piecewise affine function f returned by the algorithm.
Proof. To obtain the first support S 0 , we need to solve k shortest-path-problems and then check km many inequalities for equality. Then we need to setup the Laplacian matrix L S and compute its (generalized) inverse. Using a fast matrix multiplication algorithm, the latter can be done in O((kn) 2.4 ) time, e.g., with the Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [13] .
Given the (generalized) inverse of the Laplacian L * S , potentials and flows can be computed in O((nk) 2 ) time as it only requires the multiplication of nk × nk matrices with vectors of dimension nk. We note that by definition the matrix W S has at most k non-zero entries in every row. The vectors w S,e,i and w ′ S,e,i have also only O(k) many non-zero elements. This implies that all values λ S,e,i as well as their minimum and maximum can be computed in O(km · k) = O((kn) 2 ) time. The bottleneck is thus the computation of the (generalized) inverse of the Laplacian matrix. However, the inverse does not need to be computed from scratch, but can be obtained with the update formula from Theorem 2. Since this formula also depends only on the sparse vector w S,e,i and w ′ S,e,i with O(k)-many non-zero entries, this update step can also be computed in O((nk) 2 )-time.
Appendix

A Degeneracy
A.1 a-Degeneracy
We are now going to show how the functions start, pred, and succ can be modified, if a-degenerate supports exist. First, recall that a support S is a-degenerate, if dim(ker(L S )) > dim(N ) = k, i.e., ifL S is singular. This means that equation L S π = y has no longer a unique solution in P.
In fact, if there is an a-degenerate support S that is feasible, i.e., L S π = y has a solution, then there must be infinitely many solutions to this equation. Lemma 3 implies that the mapping from potentials to flows is injective. Thus, if there exists an a-degenerate support, then there must be also infinitely many Nash equilibrium flows for the same excess vector y and, hence, infinitely many Nash equilibria for the same demand. See Example 1 for a concrete example where such support exists. In general, for an a-degenerate support, all potentials induce the same excess vector y. Thus, λ min S = λ max S (we prove this formally in Lemma 13) and the potentials π min S and π max S are not unique. This means with our previous definition of the functions, pred and succ are not well-defined in the case of an a-degenerate support. We now proceed by adapting these functions for the case of a-degenerate games.
As before, we still (only) use S := {S : S is a feasible, non-a-degenerate, shortest-path-support} as the set of states, i.e., even in an a-degenerate game, we only consider non-a-degenerate supports as states. We observe, that start as defined before yields the support S 0 which is non-a-degenerate by Lemma 10. Hence, we only need to define new successor and predecessor functions.
The first observation that we are going to make is that any (continuative) neighboring support S ′ of some non-a-degenerate support S is not "too degenerate". Formally, we say a support S is weakly-a-degenerate if rank(L S ) = k(n − 1) − 1 (or equivalently, if dim(ker(L)) = k + 1). Then we directly obtain Lemma 12. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support. Then every neighboring support S ′ of S non-adegenerate or weakly-a-degenerate.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we know that the difference between the block Laplacians of two neighboring supports is a rank-1-matrix. Thus, rank(L S ′ ) ≥ rank(L S ) − 1 = k(n − 1) − 1.
For every weakly-a-degenerate support S we know by definition that dim(ker(L S )) = 1, i.e., there is a direction vector ∆π N S such that ker(L S ) = span(∆π N S ). (This direction is of course not unique, but it is unique up to a scalar multiplication.) We refer to this direction as the nullspace direction of the weakly-a-degenerate support S. As it will turn out, if, for example, the successor S ′ := succ(S) of some non-a-degenerate support S is a-degenerate, then we can use this direction to find another, non-a-degenerate support S ′′ by following the nullspace direction ∆π N S ′ . We can then use S ′′ as successor instead. In order to prove this formally, we first need the following, technical observations. Lemma 13. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support and S ′ be a (e, i)-neighboring, a-degenerate support. Then,
(ii) ker(L S ′ ) ∩ P = span(L + S w ′ S ′ ,e,i ). In particular, ∆π N S ′ = αL + S w ′ S ′ ,e,i for some α = 0, and w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π N S = 0.
(iii) If w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S = 0 and S ′ is feasible, then the equation L S ′ π = λ∆y + b S ′ has a solution if and only if λ = λ * S ′ for some fixed λ * S ′ ∈ [0, 1].
Using a corollary from the Sherman-Morrison formula for generalized inverses [27, Cor. 18.5.2] , we obtain rank(L S ′ ) = rank(L S ) + rank(1 + w ⊤ S,e,i L + S w ′ S,e,i ) − 1. By assumption, rank(L S ′ ) − rank(L S ) = −1 and, hence, we obtain (i). Further, we get
Thus, span(L + S w ′ S ′ ,e,i ) ⊂ ker(L S ′ ) ∩ P. Since dim(ker(L S ′ ) ∩ P) = 1, the claim (ii) follows. Assume that w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S = 0 and S ′ is feasible. Then, by feasibility, there is a λ * S ′ such that L S ′ π = λ∆y + b S ′ has a solution. However, the equation L S ′ ∆π = ∆y has no solution ∆π since
Hence, L S ′ π = λ∆y + b S ′ has a solution for at most one value of λ and (iii) follows. Statement (iv) follows directly from (ii).
Note, that the statements of Lemma 13 hold for any (fixed) choice of the generalized inverses of L S and L S ′ . In the non-a-degenerate case, we use the fact that there is a unique generalized inverse L * S that maps into P. For a-degenerate regions, there in no longer a unique such choice of the generalized inverse. For the remainder of this section we assume we have chosen some fixed generalized inverse L + S ′ that maps into P. Assume that the continuative (e, i)-neighbor S ′ of some non-a-degenerate support S is adegenerate. Then, we know that S ′ is feasible (since S and S ′ share a boundary potential), thus we can use Lemma 13(iii) and (iv) to describe the polytope P S ′ of S ′ as
We see that the polytope P S ′ of an a-degenerate region is parametrized by ξ ∈ R along the nullspace direction ∆π N S ′ , in contrast to a non-a-degenerate region S, where P S is parametrized by λ and the potential direction ∆π S .
Analogously to the non-degenerate case, we divide the edge-player-pairs into groups E + S ′ , E − S ′ , and E 0 S ′ by replacing (the non-existing) ∆π S ′ by ∆π N S ′ . Then we can define values 
Note that P S ′ could be unbounded if E + S or E − S is empty. In fact, this is not the case: Since moving along the nullspace direction ∆π N S ′ does not change the excess, the flow change ∆x with ∆x i e := w ⊤ S ′ ,e,i ∆π N S ′ if i ∈ S e and x i e = 0 if i / ∈ S e , must be a non-zero flow circulation. Since this flow ∆x satisfies by definition ∆π N,i w − ∆π N,i v = a i e ∆x e , there must be at least one edge with negative total flow ∆x e and, hence, at least one one player with negative flow ∆x i e . In particular, there is one player such that the flow change ∆x i e := w ⊤ S ′ ,e,i ∆π N S ′ does not hove the same sign for all edges. Thus, at least for this player i, one edge-player-pair (e, i) is in E + S ′ and one edge-player-pair (e ′ , i) is in E − S ′ . We therefore know that a non-a-degenerate support S ′ has well-defined boundary potentials π min S ′ , π max S ′ . As for non-a-degenerate supports we can find continuative neighbors by looking at the (e, i)-neighbors that are shortest-path-supports for all pairs (e, i) that induce ξ min S ′ and ξ max S ′ . With the same arguments as in Lemma 8, we get that there is always at least one continuative neighbor in every boundary potential and, analogously to the non-a-degenerate case, we say a region is a-b-degenerate if there is more than one continuative neighbor. We assume that every support is non-a-b-degenerate and discuss this case later in Section A.2. Then, for every non-degenerate S and any a-degenerate neighbor support S ′ , we can define the well defined mapÑ (S, S ′ ) that maps to the unique neighbor of S ′ that is not S. The next lemma proves that this support then is again non-a-degenerate and thus can be used as the successor or predecessor of S.
Lemma 14. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support. Further, let S ′ be a continuative (e, i)-neighbor of S that is a-degenerate. Then, there is a uniquely defined supportÑ (S, S ′ ) = S that is a neighbor of S ′ and non-a-degenerate.
Proof. We already argued that such support exists and is unique as long as S ′ is not a-b-degenerate. Now let S ′′ =Ñ (S, S ′ ) and assume that S ′ and S ′′ are (e ′ , i ′ )-neighbors. It remains to be shown, that S ′′ is also non-a-degenerate. By definition, (e ′ , i ′ ) is the minimizer of ξ max S or the maximizer of ξ min S , thus (e, i) / ∈ E 0 S , and we have that
Finally, let v ∈ ker(L S ′′ ). Then we have two cases.
is excluded by assumption). Hence, we have ker(L S ′′ ) = N , i.e., S ′′ is non-degenerate.
The preceding lemma enables us to redefine the neighbor functions N min and N max as follows. We define new neighbor functionsÑ min ,Ñ max : S → S ∪ {∅} bỹ Proof. The first part of the lemma follows by definition. Further, (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 9 whenever N S (π) ∈ S for the respective boundary potential π. To prove this in the case of skipping a weakly-a-degenerate support with the functionÑ (S, S ′ ) we need to prove an analogue property to Theorem 2(iii). This is difficult since the orientation of any a-degenerate is zero. We overcome this difficulty by adding a small perturbation to the block Laplacian matrices restoring the regularity ofL S ′ for the weakly degenerate support S ′ enabling us to apply Theorem 2 also in the degenerate setting.
Formally, for some δ > 0, we define the matrix D i as follows: Take the (n − 1) × (n − 1)-identity matrix multiplied by δ and insert a row and column at the position of the index of the vertex s i such that the resulting matrix has zero row-and column-sum. Thus,
Then let D be the block diagonal matrix containing the matrices D i , i = 1, . . . , k as block diagonal elements. Further, letD be the matrix obtained from D by deleting the rows and columns belonging to the source vertices of the respective players. Then, in partiuclar,D is a k(n − 1) × k(n − 1)diagonal matrix with δ on the diagonal. Hence, for every matrix A ∈ R k(n−1)×k(n−1) the matrix A +D is non-singular for almost all δ > 0. For any block Laplacian matrix L define L δ := L + D,L δ :=L δ +D, and L δ, * as the matrix obtained from L δ −1 by adding zero rows and columns for the deleted rows and columns inL δ .
(The latter is well-defined for almost all δ > 0.) Then it can be shown that L δ, * is a generalized inverse of L δ . Further, we define ∆π δ := sgn(det(L δ ))L δ, * ∆y. By definition, L δ δ→0 − −− → L and L δ δ→0 − −− →L element-wise. By the continuity of the inverse this also implies that L δ, * δ→0 − −− → L * wheneverL is non-singlar. Thus, in these cases, ∆π δ δ→0 − −− → ∆π. Let π ∈ ∂S be a boundary potential of some non-a-degenerate support such that S ′ := N (S) is a-degenerate. Further, let S ′′ :=Ñ (S, S ′ ) be the neighboring, non-a-degenerate support of S ′ from Lemma 14. We assume that S and S ′ are (e, i)-neighboring and S ′ and S ′′ are (e ′ , i ′ )-neighboring. Then,
and, analogously, L δ S ′′ = L δ S ′ + w ′ S ′′ ,e ′ ,i ′ w ⊤ S ′ ,e ′ ,i ′ . We claim that there is a δ * > 0 then such for all 0 < δ < δ * the following holds: With the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
We define a new direction ∆π δ S ′ := det(L δ S ′ )L δ, * S ′ ∆y for the support S ′ . Then, using the Sherman-Morrison formula as in Theorem 2,
Thus, by Lemma 13, the direction ∆π δ S ′ converges to (a multiple of) the nullspace direction ∆π N S ′ , i.e., there is α ∈ R such that ∆π δ 
Similarly, we can show that ∆π δ
By the definition of S ′′ , we know that the direction ∆π N S ′ is directed away from the the hyperplane that separates S and S ′ and is directed towards the hyperplane that separates S ′ and S ′′ . This means that sgn(w ⊤ S ′ ,e,i ∆π N S ′ ) = − sgn(w ⊤ S ′ ,e ′ ,i ′ ∆π N S ′ ). Finally, we obtain sgn(w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S )
This sign condition implies that, the boundary potential π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′ that lies on the boundary between S and S ′ is π min S if and only if the potential π ′ ∈ ∂S ′ ∩∂S ′′ that lies on the boundary between S ′ and S ′′ is π max S ′′ and vice versa. Thus, we get that pred(succ(S)) = S and succ(pred(S)) = S, respectively, also in the case whenÑ S = S ′′ (π). 
10 20 30 Example 1. We consider a game with 8 players on the graph given in Figure 4 . Every player has two adjacent vertices as source and sink vertex and a demand of r i = 2. The game is player-symmetric 4 , i.e., for every player the edge connecting the source and the sink vertex (e.g. e 8 for player 1) is equipped with the cost function c 1 (x) = 9x + 3 and the edges on the longer path from the source to the sink (e.g. e 1 , e 3 , e 5 for player 1) are equipped with the cost function c 2 (x) = x + 6. All other edges are assumed to have cost functions with high offsets and slopes such that they are never in the support of the respective players. As the whole game is symmetric for the players, there are three possible strategy profiles: a) All players use the direct path between source and sink. b) All players use both path between source and sink. c) All players use the long path between source and sink.
Since all strategies and all cost functions are symmetric 4 we give all potentials, flows and directions for the first player routing demand from v 1 to v 4 . All other potential and flow values are given implicitly. For small demands λr, λ ≤ 1 2 , because of the relatively high offset of the long path, all players will route their demand on the direct path to their source. The potential for the zero flow x 0 = 0 is the shortest path potential π 0 = (0, 6, 12, 3) ⊤ . This yields the initial support S 0 where the edges e 1 , e 3 and e 8 are active for the player 1. (Note that we consider the edges e 1 , e 3 active although they are not used by the player. They are only part of the shortest path network.) We obtain the potential direction ∆π 0 = (0, 2, 4, 36) ⊤ that induces the flow direction ∆x 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2) ⊤ . For λ = 1 2 , we obtain the potential π 1 = (0, 7, 14, 21) = π 0 + 1 2 ∆π 0 inducing the flow x 1 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) ⊤ , i.e., every player routes exactly one flow unit on the direct path from source to sink.
Denote by e l i the last edge of the long path for player i (e.g. e l 1 = e 5 ). In the potential π 1 , all edges e l i become active at once 5 . This defines a new support S 1 which is then is a-degenerate, the Laplacian matrix has rank 23 and ker(L S 1 ) ∩ P = span (0, 1, 2, 3) ⊤ . Hence, the nullspace direction is ∆π N S 1 = (0, 1, 2, 3) ⊤ inducing the circulation ∆x 1 = 1 3 , 0, 1 3 , 0, 1 3 , 0, 0, − 1 3 ⊤ . The potential π 2 := π 1 + 3 ∆π N S 1 = (0, 10, 20, 30) ⊤ induces the flow x 2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ⊤ . Note that this flow is still an equilibrium for the demand 1 2 r. In fact, all flows
are equilibria for the demand 1 2 r, i.e., there are infinitely many equilibria when every player wants to route a demand of 1.
Finally, denote by e d i the direct edge connecting the source and sink of player i (e.g. e d 1 = e 8 ). All these edges become inactive in the potential π 2 which defines the next support S 2 6 which is non-a-degenerate. With this support, we obtain the direction ∆π 2 = (0, 8, 16, 24) ⊤ inducing the flow direction ∆x = (2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0) ⊤ . For λ = 1 we then get the potential π 3 := π 2 + 1 2 ∆π 3 = (0, 14, 28, 42) ⊤ inducing the (solution) flow x 3 = (2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0) ⊤ .
A.2 b-Degeneracy
In this section, we develop a rule for handling b-degenerate games. A game is b-degenerate, if there is a b-degenerate support. That is by definition a support with |N min S | > 1 or |N max S | > 1, i.e., a support with a boundary potential that is feasible in more than one (e, i)-neighboring supports. This is the case if and only if max (e,i)∈E − Sλ S,e,i or max (e,i)∈E + Sλ S,e,i has not a unique solution (e, i). Concretely, this means that when increasing or decreasing the demand, multiple edge-player-pairs have their activity status at once, e.g., if two edges become active for one player or one edge becomes inactive for two players and so on.
Intuitively, b-degeneracy occurs if the offsets of the cost functions b are chosen in a bad way such that the hyperplanes induced by the inequalities in the polytopes P S intersect exactly in some boundary potential of some support. It is also somewhat intuitive that a very small, random perturbation of the offsets b would translate the hyperplanes in a way that, almost surely, they do not intersect in boundary potentials anymore. Further, a small perturbation should not change the equilibrium to much.
In fact, we will show that there is an explicit, small perturbation ǫ that can be added to the vector b such that the game with these perturbed offsets is non-b-degenerate. Further, we will show that all feasible supports in this game are also feasible for the original, unperturbed game and, hence, it will be enough to compute the states S of the perturbed game. Additionally, we will see that it is not necessary to carry out the perturbation explicitly. Rather, we can follow a lexicographic criterion. We initially assume that every game is non-a-degenerate and discuss a-b-degeneracy below.
Let ε > 0. Then we define the perturbation vector ε := ε, ε 2 , . . . , ε km−1 , ε km ⊤ ∈ R mk and the vector of perturbed offsets b ε := b + ε. We call the game with this offset vector the perturbed game. By definition, for every support S, the perturbed polytope
contains all potentials with support S in the perturbed game. Analogously to the non-degenerate case, we define values λ ε S,e,i := 
for every non-a-degenerate support S.
With the next theorem, we will prove two things: First, we show that every support that is feasible in the perturbed game is also feasible in the original justifying that it is sufficient to consider just these supports. Second, we show that the perturbed game is non-b-degenerate.
For any support S, we say two edges e, e ′ are serial-dependent for player i in support S if e, e ′ are serial-dependent in the subgraph of G containing only the active edges of player i.
Theorem 10. Let S be a non-a-degenerate, total support. Then there is ε * S > 0 such that for all 0 < ε < ε * S the following holds.
(i) If S is infeasible, then P ε S = ∅ as well. (iii) If S is feasible and b-degenerate, then P ε S = ∅ or, for any two edge-player-pairs (e, i), (e ′ , i ′ ) / ∈ E 0 S , we have thatλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ implies thatλ ε S,e,i = 0 or i = i ′ and e, e ′ are serial-dependent for player i.
Proof. Let S be an infeasible support. Denote by α e,i (λ) := u ⊤ e,i T S W S (G ⊤ π − b) the value of the left hand side of the inequality corresponding to the pair (e, i). Note that α e,i (λ) depends continuously on λ via the vector π which is a continuous function of λ. Since S is infeasible, there is, for every λ ∈ [0, 1], at least one inequality that has strictly positive left-hand-side and is thus violated. This means α(λ) := max (e,i) α e,i (λ) > 0. As α(λ) is continuous function, we get α := min λ∈[0,1] α(λ) > 0.
Every inequality in P ε
S is perturbed by some value β e,i (ε) with β e,i (ε) ǫ→0 −−→ 0. Thus, if we choose ε * S small enough, then β e,i (ε) < α for all pairs (e, i) and all 0 < ε < ε * S . This implies that there is a violated inequality in P ε S for every λ as well. Hence, P ε S = ∅ and (i) follows. If S is feasible and non-b-degenerate, then there is unique minimizer (e, i) = argmin (e ′ ,i ′ )∈E + Sλ S,e ′ ,i ′ . This implies α :=λ S,e ′ ,i ′ −λ S,e,i > 0 for all (e, i) = (e ′ , i ′ ) ∈ E + S . If we denote by β e,i (ε) := − τ S e,i u ⊤ e,i X S W S ε σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S the perturbation of the valueλ S,e,i , then we choose ε * S small enough such that |β e ′ ,i ′ (ε)| < α 2 for all pairs (e ′ , i ′ ). But then,λ ε S ′ ,e ′ ,i ′ −λ ε S,e,i =λ S,e ′ ,i ′ − β e ′ ,i ′ (ε) −λ S,e,i + β e ′ ,i ′ (ε) > 0.
Hence, (e, i) is the unique minimizer of argmin (e ′ ,i ′ )∈E + Sλ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ . Since the same proof holds also for the maximizer, (ii) follows.
For the last statement, we have to prove that if S is feasible and P ε S = ∅, thenλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ only occurs for serial-dependent edges of one player i. For the rest of the proof, we assume that 0 < ε < ε * S and that ε * S is chosen small enough to ensure thatλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ implies that λ S,e,i =λ S,e ′ ,i ′ . (This is true since we can choose ε * S so small such thatλ S,e,i =λ S,e ′ ,i ′ implies λ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ by choosing ε * S similar to the proof of (ii).) Further, we assume that ε * S is chosen small enough such that X S W S ε = 0 for all 0 < ε < ε * S . Using these assumptions leads to the following claim.
Claim 7. If, for two pairs (e, i), (e ′ , i ′ ) ∈ E 0 S , we haveλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ , then
Proof of Claim 7. Assume thatλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ . Then, as stated above we can assume thatλ S,e,i = λ S,e ′ ,i ′ holds as well since ε is chosen small enough. Thus,
By our assumption on ε and the fact that W S has full rank by Lemma 3, the claim follows.
Claim 7 shows that twoλ ε S,e,i values can be the same only if a certain vector is in the left nullspace of the matrix X S . Therefore, we study the left nullspace of X S in the next claim. Proof of Claim 8. Let Y S := W S G ⊤ L * S GΩ S = W S G ⊤ (GΩ S W S G ⊤ ) * GΩ S . Then we can write X S = Y S − I mk .
We note that the space spanned by the colums of GΩ S is a subspace of the space spanned by the columns of L S = GΩWG ⊤ . Thus, we can use [27, Lemma 9.3.5], which yields
Hence, GΩ S X S = 0 and the if-direction follows.
For the only-if direction, observe that rank(Y S ) ≤ rank(GΩ S ) by definition. On the other hand, we have that rank(GΩ S ) = rank(GΩ S Y S ) ≤ rank(Y S ). Thus, rank(Y S ) = rank(GΩ S ). We conclude that for every v that is not a combination of the rows of GΩ S , v ⊤ Y S = 0 (otherwise the rank of Y S would be strictly greater than rank(GΩ S )). Thus, if there is no z with v = (GΩ S ) ⊤ z, then v ⊤ Y S = 0 and, hence, v ⊤ X S = −v ⊤ = 0 and the only-if-direction follows.
Claim 8 states that a vector v is in the left nullspace of the matrix X S if and only if there is a potential vector z that assigns a potential value z i v for every player to every vertex such that v e,i = 0 if i / ∈ S e ,
for every edge e = (v, w) and every player i ∈ [k]. Thus, in particular, the components of every vector of the left nullspace of X S that corresponds to a player-edge-pair with an inactive edge are zero. We denote by ∆x := W S G ⊤ L * S ∆y the (pseudo-)flow change on the edges in support S. In particular, the vector ∆x S := Ω S ∆x S contains the (real) flow change on all active edges. (In fact, it is easy to show that G∆x S = ∆y, hence ∆x S is a (not necessarily positive) flow for demand r.) Claim 9. Let (e, i) be some edge-player-pair with i ∈ S e . If u ⊤ e,i ∆x S = 0, thenλ ε S,e,i = 0 or the edge e is contained in a cycle in the subgraph of G induced by the active edges of player i.
Proof of Claim 9. Since we assume that e is active for player i, we have that u ⊤ e,i ∆x S = u ⊤ e,i ∆x S = 0, i.e., the flow change on edge e for player i is not zero. This implies, since ∆x S is a flow, e must lie on some path of active edge between s i and t i . If there e is not contained in some (active) cycle for player i, all s i -t i -paths in the active network use e and, thus, e must carry all flow, i.e., x i e = λr i for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Thus, the inequality corresponding to the edge player pair (e, i) is x i e = λr i ≥ 0. Sinceλ ε S,e,i computes, by definition, the value λ for which this inequality is tight, we get thatλ ε S,e,i = 0.
Claim 10. Let (e, i), (e ′ , i ′ ) / ∈ E 0 S be two player-edge-pairs withλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ = 0. Then i = i ′ .
Proof of Claim 10. First, we note that, since (e, i) / ∈ E 0 S implies 0 = σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S = τ S e,i u ⊤ e,i W S G ⊤ L * S ∆y = τ S e,i ∆x S .
Second, by Claim 7, we get that there is a vector v in the left nullspace of X S with v e,i = 0, v e ′ ,i ′ = 0 and all other components equal to zero. Thus, we infer from (20) that i ∈ S e and i ′ ∈ S e ′ . Together this means that the Claim 10 applies, hence we can assume that both edges lie in cycles of active edges. If i = i ′ , then the edge e is the only edge in the network of active edges of player i with non-zero value v e,i . Since all values vẽ ,i = 0 for all other edgesẽ in this cycle, we have that z i w = z i v for every edgeẽ = (v, w) along the cycle. But this implies that, in particular, v e,i = 0, and thus we have a contradiction and conclude that i = i ′ . By Claim 10, we have that if P ε S = ∅ andλ ε S,e,i = 0 andλ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ , we have i = i ′ . We conclude the proof by showing that in this case e and e ′ are also serial-dependent for player i.
By Claim 7, we know that there is a vector v in the left nullspace that has only two non-zero v e,i and v e ′ ,i . By Claim 8 we know that this vector satisfies also (20) . Thus, we know there is a potential vector z that is constant for all players other than i and that satsifies z i w = z i v for all edges (v, w) / ∈ {e, e ′ }. Since, furthermore, both edges must be contained in a cycle of active edges by Claim 9, v e,i and v e ′ ,i can only be non-zero if e and e ′ are serial-dependent in the active network of player i. Theorem 10 shows that any infeasible support stays infeasible, when perturbing the offsets b, any non-b-degenerate support stays feasible and every b-degenerate support is either removed (infeasible), has "essentially unique" maximizer and minimizer of the valuesλ ε S,e,i , or has λ min,ε S = 0. The latter yields the following corollary. Proof. Assume that we have more than one continuative neighbor for one boundary potential of some feasible support S of the perturbed game. Then,λ ε S,e,i =λ ε S,e ′ ,i ′ andλ ε S,e,i = 0, since we do not need any (unique) neighbor for a 0-potential. Thus we know from Theorem 10 that i = i ′ and e and e ′ are serial-dependent in the active network for player i. Then, as we already argued in the proof of Lemma 8, only inactivating the edge e that is the farthest away from s i yields a shortestpath-support. Thus, there is just one well-defined continuative neighbor-the (e, i) neighbor with e being the farthest from s i .
Denote by
S ε := {S : S is a feasible, non-a-degenerate, shortest-path-support for offsets b + ε} the support states of the game with perturbed offsets b + ε. Then, by Theorem 10(i), we have that S ε ⊆ S. Since the perturbed game is non-b-degenerate, it has as shown before a unqiue initial support for the zero flow as well as well-defined predecessor and successor functions. Since S ε ⊆ S we can also use these functions for the unperturbed, degenerate game.
Note that Theorem 10 also implies that, for every game with offset vector b that is in general position, the game is non-b-degenerate. Implicit perturbation. As mentioned above, it is not necessary to carry out the perturbation explicitly. The initial support can be found by computing the unique shortest path for the edge length b + ε for every player. To do this without explicit computation, we can just compute the shortest paths for edge lengths b and then compute on the resulting shortest path network again shortest paths, but this time with respect to the edge length u e,i . For the second shortest path computation we assign vectors as path length and then compute the lexicographically shortest path. By doing so, we consider edges being shorter if the monomial ε l assigned to this edge has higher a higher degree. For small ε this is equivalent to computing the shortest paths with explicit ε values.
The same idea can be used to compute the successors and predecessors. If two edge-player-pairs have the sameλ S,e,i value, then we have to compare the value added by the perturbation. This is as shown above the polynomial p S,e,i (ε) :=λ ε S,e,i −λ S,e,i = − τ S e,i u ⊤ e,i X S W S σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S ε.
Again, for small ε, it is equivalent to finding the polynomial p S,e,i (ε) with minimal value to just find the lexicographically smallest coefficient vector of these polynomials, i.e., the lexicographically smallest vector m S,e,i := − τ S e,i u ⊤ e,i X S W S σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S .
Hence, we do not need the explicit perturbation for the successor and predecessor functions, neither.
a-b-degenerate games. Finally, we discuss the case of a-b-degeneracy. An a-degenerate region is also b-degenerate, if the maximum or minimum in ξ min S or ξ max S do not have a unique maximizer or minimizer. We will now argue, that in the perturbed version of the game, this does not happen. If we consider the game with perturbed offsets b + ε, we get perturbed versions of the valuesξ S,e,i , analogously to the valuesλ ε S,e,i above. If S is an a-degenerate support, then we obtain the followinḡ ξ S,e,i values for the perturbed game: ξ ε S,e,i :=ξ S,e,i − τ S e,i u ⊤ e,i X S W S ε σ S w ⊤ S,e,i ∆π S , where X S := (W S G ⊤ L + S GΩ S − I mk ) for some fixed choice of the generalized inverse L + S . Thus, the perturbation has the same effect on the valuesξ S,e,i as on the valuesλ S,e,i , and we can prove an analogue version of Theorem 10 for the valuesξ S,e,i . The only difference now is that the matrix X S depends on the generalized inverse L + S which has in general lower rank than the inverse L * S in non-a-degenerate region. However, since the rowspace of Y S := W S G ⊤ L + S GΩ S is by definition still a subset of the rowspace of GΩ S , we still have that v ⊤ X S = 0 only if there exists a potential z with v = (GΩ S ) ⊤ z. This is a weaker form of Claim 8 in the proof of Theorem 10 (where we have an if and only if statement), but still enough for the rest of the proof to hold.
Thus, we have that in the perturbed game, we always find a unique neighbor, also in the a-bdegenerate case. By comparing the vectors m S,e,i lexicographically, we still can find these unique neighbors implicitly.
